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1

INTRODUCTION

Societies organize themselves along many different lines such as religion, class, political
ideology, geography, and ethnicity, yet when societies go to war it is usually between groups
defined by ethnicity (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). Ethnic conflicts are conflicts where groups
define their goals exclusively in ethnic terms and in which the fault-line of confrontation is one
of ethnic variation (Cordell and Wolf, 2010). In this paper, an ethnic conflict is understood as "
organized large-scale violent conflict among ethnic groups of which at least one has not achieved
statehood or is not in possession of the state apparatus" (Angstrom, 2000). According to
Sambanis (2001), “not all wars are the same, each war is as different as the society that produce
it”. Therefore, to understand ethnic conflicts, we need to understand the societies that produce
them and identify the pathways that lead to violence among groups. Under what conditions do
ethnic conflicts occur? The literature is generally divided into three major schools of thought:
The first one is primordialism. Regarding ethnicity, primordialists argue that "ethnic
groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial
objects such as biological factors and especially territorial location" (Gryosby,1994). It relies on
the assumptions made by kinship theorists that beings are more likely to favor kin over nonkin
(Van den Berghe, 1987). It is an inherent psychological trait, and it is noticeable in the way we
treat family. Individuals are more likely to treat individuals with the same characteristics as them
better than those who do not. These characteristics are generally ascriptive, meaning they are
beyond their control, like race or ethnicity. Primordialist ideas imply that ethnic conflicts are
unavoidable within heterogeneous ethnic societies.
The second school, constructivism, argues that cultural identities like ethnicity are socially
constructed. They are the product of historical processes like immigration and colonization.
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According to Cederman and Wimmer (2009), countries characterized by particular ethnopolitical
configurations are more likely to experience violent conflicts. In other words, ethnic conflicts
result from historical processes and specific configurations. For example, colonial
administrations in many countries shaped identities and their relations with each other for social
and political control. They reinforced exclusive identities like ethnicity and encouraged the belief
of "us against them."
Instrumentalists argue that elites politicize ethnicity to gain power. Political leaders
organize, unify, and mobilize populations along ethnic lines to secure their supporters' loyalty. It
creates strongly polarized political parties and leads to a hostile and fragile environment. Such
political strategies lead to the social and political exclusion of a particular group (ethnicity)
within the population. According to the instrumentalist argument, ethnic conflicts are the results
of political games between leaders.
In this paper, I will explain under what conditions ethnic conflicts occur by using the case
of Cote D’Ivoire. In my opinion ethnic conflicts result from a complex interaction between the
constructivist and instrumentalist theories. I argue that the French colonial practices politicized
ethnicity which created ethnically based politics in the post-colonial era. It led to a competition
for resources and tensions among ethnic groups. However, it is the structure of the political
system that determine if violence will occur or not. Through their colonial policy of divide and
rule, the French administration made ethnicity a salient identity for populations. The colonial
legacy had a major impact on the post-colonial administration because after independence,
political leaders perpetuated these ethnically based politics. Ethnic identity remained salient in
politics and became a cleavage for political mobilization. I further claim that political strategies
build along ethnic lines are more likely to result in conflicts in multiparty systems because ethnic
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groups perceive the state as a prize. Only by entering and exerting influence in the political arena
can ethnic groups articulate their social, cultural, and economic interests. In such process of
electoral competition, leaders seek to achieve their goals through two major mechanisms: (1) the
ethnic polarization of political parties and (2) the installation of the fear of victimization. In Cote
d’Ivoire, the findings indicate that ethnic conflicts were the consequences of ethnic politics
established since the French colonial era. First, I will examine the existing literature on ethnic
conflicts and ethnic politics. Secondly, I will present my argument and describe the pathway
through which I suggest societies move toward ethnic conflicts. The third part of the paper is the
case study of Cote d’Ivoire from the colonial era to the civil war of 2011 followed by an analysis
of the evidence. Finally, I will share the implications of the findings and the limitations of my
study.

2

LITTERATURE REVIEW

First, it is essential to examine the existing literature on ethnic conflicts and ethnic
politics. I identified three major school of thoughts: Primordialism, Constructivism and
Instrumentalism
2.1

Primordialism
An assumption about the origins of ethnic conflicts is that ethnic heterogeneous societies

are more prone to civil wars than homogenous societies. Kinship theorists support this idea
because individuals from the same group work on maintaining the "uniqueness" and "purity" of
their group. As human beings, we tend to favor kin over nonkin, and ethnic groups can be
perceived as extended kin groups. The psychological factor that leads individuals to develop a
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closer bond to those who share similar characteristics like family also creates mistrust toward
others who do not (Vanhanen, 1999). Individuals perceive the world in a "us vs. them" manner.
Regarding ethnicity, there is a lot of distrust among groups. They naturally fear each other.
Therefore, they fight for power because it means survival. It becomes instinctive to monopolize
power and share it with your kin. And above everything, it is crucial to keep power away from
the others for protection. Pierre L. van den Berghe (1987) introduced the concept of ethnic
nepotism. According to him, "ethnic sentiments are an extension of kinship sentiments," and
members of an ethnic group tend to favor their group members over non-members because they
are more related to their group members than outsiders. Vanhanen (1999) later added to his study
and explained that this tendency to favor kin over nonkin becomes salient in social life and
politics when people and groups compete for scarce resources.
One of the main criticisms of primordialism is that it seems to ignore the structural, economic
and political processes within which these conflicts erupt and solely focuses on the kin
relationships (McKay, 2011). Research has shown the importance of historical processes like
migration, colonialism and war in shaping societies (Cassanelli, 2016), therefore the
primordialism theory is not comprehensive. The primordialist assumptions imply that conflicts
are inherent to heterogeneous ethnic societies and, therefore, unavoidable. Evidence does not
support these assumptions because some societies like Botswana, an ethnically heterogenous
country which, compared to many African countries, have peaceful ethnic relations (Holm and
Molutsi, 1992).Another hypothesis is that alliances, such as marriages between different groups,
should be unusual. Cooperation between different ethnic groups should be rare, see inexistent.
However, evidence reveals that cooperation does not occur only among relatives and kin groups
but extends to nonkin groups. Finally, primordialist arguments do not account for the timing of
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an outbreak of violence (Jackson, 2004). For instance, why do the conflicts happen when they do
and not earlier or later? Why did the Arab –African identities in the 2003 Darfur conflict become
such meaningful markers and not during the earlier conflicts in the region? This genetically
based idea of ethnicity does not adequately address these sorts of questions.
2.2

Constructivism
The second theory is constructivism. According to the constructivist theory, ethnic

identities are socially constructed. They are formed through colonization, immigration, etc. They
are the product of historical processes, which in turn affect ethnic groups creating hostility
between them. Identities along chiefly lines were fluid and not strictly defined. Influences in
history have affected the relations between ethnic groups, causing hostility. Such configuration
evolved and created a conducive environment for violence. The maintenance of exclusive
identities by the colonial administration and the post-colonial ruling elites created an
environment for violence. According to Ranger (1991), in Africa, the combination of missionary
delineations, colonial restructuring with the complicity of African elites led to the intensification
of ethnic ideologies. This theory suggests that civil wars occur along ethnic lines because
historical processes like colonial policies created a struggle for power and therefore tensions
among ethnic groups.
Ethnicity and grievances
Scholars like Horowitz (1985) argued that groups are more likely to rebel if they had been
actively discriminated against by the state. Such discrimination could be the result of past
colonial policies that have become entrenched. Ethnic division of power is the result of colonial
practices that favored one ethnic group over another, as was the case in Rwanda, Uganda, and
Nigeria (Keefer, 2008; Young, 1994). It may also result from imperial practices, as occurred in
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the Soviet Union when ‘titular’ ethnic groups were favored at the expense of larger, more
dominant ethnic groups (Gorenburg, 2006). It may arise from simple demographics where the
largest ethnic group in a country was able to consolidate power as the state was being
constructed (for example, the Castilian people of Spain).
Ethnic groups and bargaining problems
Civil wars divide along ethnic lines because leaders of ethnically based opposition groups
face severe divisibility and commitment problems. Some groups may be less willing to divide
certain stakes such as territory because it holds great symbolic value to group members
(Goddard, 2006; Hassner, 2003; Toft, 2006). Ethnic groups are likely to have deeper ties to
territory for historical reasons (Hensel, 2000). This creates a situation where members of an
ethnic group may place greater value on retaining a piece of territory, making the group more
likely to fight for it and less amenable to side-payments (Holsti, 1991).
However, some limitations make this theory inconclusive. It does not explain why conflicts
occur at a particular time and not at others. It seems to miss a step between these ethnopolitical
configurations and the onset. What triggers violence at specific points in time and not at others?
How can these ethnicities coexist peacefully for years without conflicts? The constructivist
theory fails to establish a precise causal mechanism between historical processes and ethnic
conflicts.
2.3

Instrumentalism

For other scholars, identities like ethnicity are not the principal cause of ethnic conflicts.
The instrumentalist theory argues that it is rational for parties to organize along ethnic lines
depending on the benefit it brings to them. Therefore, political leaders use ethnicity as a political
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strategy to achieve their goals. They use their cultural, ethnic groups as mobilization sites to gain
power (Bačová,1998). Ethnicity is exploited as a strategic coalition to win constituencies and
secure voters' loyalty. Consequently, ethnic conflict arises among rational agents over scarce
resources driven by political leaders' aims for political or economic gains or a deliberate
manipulation based on a rational decision to incite or encourage ethnic violence (Chandra, 2004).

Ethnic competition theory emphasizes the function of resource competition as the
rationale for ethnic group formation, interethnic clashes, and the crystallization of ethnic and
political movements (Nagel, 1995). Motivational ethnic paradigms "view ethnicity as a political
phenomenon and rationally constructed vehicle designed to further individual interests and
exploit the 'structure of opportunity' in the host country" (Yancey, 1976). Organizational
paradigm "relies on rational, voluntary choice and the instrumentality of political association"
(Gross, 1996)). To derive their objectives, therefore, individuals and organizations sometimes
develop ideologies and symbols that are used as their rallying cries to whip up support from
group members (for example, the Zulus in South Africa)

Political Patronage

Political patronage is a strategy used by leaders to strengthen their control and secure
voters. It is defined as the appointment or hiring of a person to a government post based
on partisan loyalty. Scholars studying the patronage politics in Africa commonly assert that
leaders distribute patronage along ethnic lines (Denny, 2013). Patronage and policy favoritism
may follow lines of ethnicity because shared identity provides better methods of coordination
and mobilization, or because similarities of language and culture provide denser networks, and
norms of reciprocity that allow for easier sanctioning of in-group members (Kitschelt, 2007).
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Ethnicity provides an important source of information to voters about what they can expect from
their elected officials. Ethnic conflicts (Hoffman, 2013).

Multipartyism
Since the (re)introduction of multiparty elections in the early 1990s, ethnically dominated
party systems have been the norm in sub-Saharan Africa. Political parties have been
distinguished from each other largely based on who they represent rather than by what they
represent. They have been associated with particular ethnic groups and that association is central
to what distinguishes one party from another (Lindberg 2006). The liberalization of the political
system in the wake of the political and economic pressures brought by international lending
organizations led to the formation of political parties along ethnic or regional lines. The political
parties were created within the context of resource competition for the control of amenities and
scarce resources. In such political confrontations, the nation- state is only relevant to the extent
that it is being used to further group interest and advantage (Udogu, 2018). This implies that
ethnic conflicts are likely to occur around election times when power is at stake.

3

ARGUMENT

Ethnic conflicts result from a complex interaction between the constructivist and
instrumentalist theories. I argue that the French colonial practices politicized ethnicity which
created ethnically based politics in the post-colonial era. It led to a competition for resources and
tensions among ethnic groups. However, it is the structure of the political system that determine
if violence will occur or not. I further claim that the shift to multiparty system make civil
conflicts more likely than it would have been otherwise (under a single-party system) because
ethnic groups perceive the state as a prize. In Cote d’Ivoire, I argue that the favoritism by the
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French colonial administration of one group (Southern ethnic groups) over the others created a
system that strongly favored competition for resources, social and political exclusion. Such
system was instrumentalized by political leaders under multipartyism with strategies that
eventually led to civil wars.
Colonialism was not just responsible for the creation of ethnic identities but also for
shaping their spatial distributions, relative sizes, and numbers. Colonial administrations
established exclusive identities through their socio-political dynamics. The French and British
colonial styles created different systems of ethnic stratification which impacted post-colonial
ethnic conflicts. In this paper I am focusing on the French colonial power and its centralized
style. Modern colonial powers-maintained control over their empires by using three main
strategies. The first one is assimilation, and it involves co-opting the native elite through bribery
or by extending certain privileges or rights (Morrock, 1973). The second is association. It is the
colonization-settlement of large numbers of Europeans among the subject peoples to create a
relationship between the conqueror and the conquered. This strategy was supposed to respect the
existing cultural and political African institutions. However, the implementation was superficial.
The third strategy is “divide and rule”. A policy that played a crucial part in ensuring the stability
and the viability of every major colonial system” (Morrock,1973). According to Morrock, the
four basic tactics of "divide and rule" practiced by Western colonialists are: the creation of
differences within the conquered population, the augmentation of existing differences, the
exploitation of these differences for the benefit of the colonial power and finally, the
politicization of these differences so that they carry over into the post-colonial period. In Cote
d’Ivoire, I argue that several of these tactics were used simultaneously. The colonial statehood
created an internal security dilemma for African rulers after independence. According to
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Roessler, due to these historical considerations, African leaders in post-colonial era are facing a
dilemma and must make general power-sharing tradeoff to secure their power (Posner, 2005).
They can decide to exclude rivals from power and reduce risks of coup from that group, but in
turn raise the likelihood of outsider rebellion (Paine, 2019). Throughout this paper, I assume that
political leaders are rational actors. To remain in power, keep control over territories and assure
their overall political survival, they make the rational choice to divide and rule. Rational Action
Theory maintains that people calculate the benefits and costs of their actions and choices before
deciding what to do (Scott, 2000). Self-interest is the cornerstone of political behavior (Downs,
1957). People are essentially motivated by their own interests. Rationality is understood not in
terms of “rational goals,” but only in terms of rational means to achieve goals, i.e., efficient
means (Gandhi, 2005). Colonial-era policies and administrative structure led to the emergence of
specific ethnic identities. Those pre-existing cleavages and ethnic delineations are utilized by
post-colonial ruling elites to build political coalitions. Colonial divide and rule policies provided
them with new spheres of influence, new avenues of control over land and other local resources.
I argue that political leaders instrumentalize the legacy of colonial administrations to
remain in power. They successfully mobilize ethnic groups into political parties because of the
preexisting layout from colonial times that they keep perpetuating. Such strategies built along
ethnic lines are more salient when elections are imminent because political leaders and ruling
elites aim to gain power and control. I further claim that these ethnic conflicts are less likely to
occur in one-party systems than in multi-party systems because the stakes are higher in the latter.
The transition from a one-party system with non-existent political competition to a multiparty
system in which parties compete for power creates a tumult. In fact, this transition changes the
boundaries of the effective arena of political competition. It expands it from the electoral

11
constituency to the whole nation and in turn affects the axes of political competition (Posner,
2005). Under a single-party system, the candidates of the party do not have to compete for their
constituencies’ votes. It is an internal election within party’s members, so ethnic cleavage is not
considered a political strategy to win. While, under a multi-party system, the arena of
competition is extended to the whole nation. In 1972, Zambian Vice President Mainza Chona
made a statement to support his case for the adoption of a new one-party system instead of the
multi-party system in place, he declared: “We find that there has been peace in areas where there
has been one party rule only. For example, there was a lot of violence in the Eastern Province
where both UNIP and ANC had substantial support, but this violence completely died down
when UNIP remained as the only party. On the line of rail, political violence, riots, and deaths
have occurred mostly in Livingstone and Mufulira, where inter-party competition is strong…
villagers have suffered a lot by being beaten up by political opponents, having their houses or
their food stores burned… and a lot of other criminal acts.” (Parliamentary Debates, 6 December
1972, cols. 54-59). According to his argument, multiparty competition generates ethnic conflict.
The decision to include or exclude particular groups from power can be made based on
different criteria like political ideology, religious beliefs or culture. Then why do leaders choose
ethnicity instead of other identities to mobilize? According to Posner (2005), the identities that
individuals will find most advantageous to choose will depend on the nature of the political
system’s ethnic cleavage structure. Through a process of electoral competition, the most useful
identity to mobilize will be the one that puts the person or the party in a winning coalition.
People want resources from the state, and they believe that having someone from their ethnic
group in a position of power can facilitate their access to those resources. The best way to
achieve this goal is to join or build a political coalition to run during elections. Given the
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expectation that elected officials will favor members of their ethnic groups in the distribution of
development resources and patronage benefits, voters will elect members of their own ethnic
groups to positions of political power. In fact, when politicians promise to distribute
development resources to the people whose votes they are seeking, voters use ethnicity as a cue
to distinguish between promises that are credible and those that are not. Politicians in turn,
knowing this will seek to improve their electoral prospects by framing their electoral appeals in
ethnic terms. The first tactic utilized by political elites is party polarization and they use the
preexisting ethnic cleavages (legacy of colonial administrations) for mobilization. These political
parties engage in confrontational, exclusionary strategies that create strong boundaries of usversus-them distinctions, in order to mobilize constituencies and boost organizational cohesion
(LeBas, 2006). These tactics divide the electorate into opposing camps. According to Tilly
(2003), where polarization occurs, processes of inclusion (internal solidarity) and exclusion
(policing of relations across the boundary, justification of the boundary) are intensified.
Under multipartyism, ethnic groups perceive the state as a prize. Only by entering and
exerting influence in the political arena can ethnic groups articulate their social, cultural, and
economic interests. The rationalist approach within ethnic conflict literature assumes that
individuals in one group make decisions on the basis of their fears about the intentions or the
actions of the other group (Lebas, 2006). Many argue that it is fear driven by their survival
instinct that motivates people to fight and use violence. This is the second strategy utilized by
political elites, fear. Susan Woodward wrote “the appeal to nation is made in terms of arguments
about survival in which the fate of the individual depends on the fate of the group, and the role of
the group and its leaders is protection … Fear of becoming a minority is exactly what is
motivating the people to fight.” Because just like states ethnic groups fear for their survival.
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According to de Figueiredo and Weingast (1999), ethnic conflict is a social dilemma. Weak
leaders use ethnic violence to remain in power. They combine fear of victimization among the
citizenry and uncertainty about leaders’ intention to cause ethnic conflicts and achieve their
goals. Indeed, fear of extreme consequences beyond their control drive citizens to support
violence to avoid becoming a victim. A research by Mansfield and Snyder supports that the
likelihood of war increases due to the interests of elite groups and the effectiveness of their
propaganda over diverse constituencies. They argue that hardliners resort the use of nationalism
to draw support from coalition of conflicting and diverse political groups. They create a fear of
victimization in a way that citizens do not view the choice between peace and violence but rather
between fighting or being a victim. To this end, the elite manipulates media and sponsor
violence.
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4

METHODOLOGY

The French colonial practices politicized ethnicity which created ethnically based politics
in the post-colonial era. The competition for resources that ensured created tensions among
ethnic groups. However, it is the shift to multiparty system that make civil conflicts more likely.
To test my argument, I will conduct a longitudinal case study of Cote d'Ivoire, analyzing two
major time periods focusing on the interaction between colonial heritage, party systems and their
impact on the occurrence of civil wars. The first one focuses on politics under the single-party
system under Felix Houphouet-Boigny, from 1960 to 1989, while the second examines politics
under the multi-party system from 1990 till the outbreak of the second Ivorian civil war in 2011.
In my opinion, this method allows a lot of details to be collected that would normally be
overlooked by a quantitative approach. The purpose of the research is to look beyond the
numbers and analyze the interactions between individuals, groups across time and space. In my
opinion, the data collected from our case study will be richer and of greater depth. I selected
Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) for a few reasons:

•

It is an ethnically heterogeneous country with more than sixty ethnic groups.

•

The French colonial administration affected the layout of ethnic groups and their
connection to each other through the “balkanization” of the country.

•

Transitioned from a one-party system to a multiparty system with at least four major
political parties.

•

Experienced two civil wars with ethnic backgrounds within a ten-year period.
There are important things I expect to observe in Cote d'Ivoire if my theory is correct:

15
•

Highly polarized political parties divided along ethnic lines. We should observe political
parties that are highly polarized and define themselves (officially or informally) in term
of ethnic affiliation.

•

Civil wars occurred after the transition to multipartism. We expect to see national and
ethnic identity at the core of policies under both one-party and multi-party regimes. But
such policies are more likely to lead to conflict under multiparty system because of the
heightened political competition.

•

Policies and/or laws with ethnic nature. We expect to observe the implementation
through official or informal means of policies which goals are to advance or to exclude a
part of the population based on ethnicity. Ideally, such policies will change, evolve
depending on which group holds the power (Presidency).

•

Tensions and violence are expected during elections, pre-electoral, and post-electoral
period. Elite and officials engage in discursive practices that reinforce the existing ethnic
cleavage.

•

Electoral campaigns designed to mobilize and unify individuals from the same ethnic
groups while deprecating other groups. We will be looking at electoral slogans and
campaigns, declarations and speeches made by political leaders, newspapers, TV news,
and other communication outlets with ethnic undertone. Another important aspect will be
the difference between how campaigns are conducted in a candidates’ region of origin
and how it is in those of his rivals.

Sources
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My proposal is essentially drawn from literature on ethnic conflicts, books, articles, and their
findings. They represent the primary sources of my argument. In terms of evidence, I am
building up my case study using secondary sources like media reports, newspapers, interviews,
and speeches.
5
5.1

CASE STUDY

Colonial Period
Michael Watts describes colonialism as “The establishment and maintenance of rule, for

an extended period of time by a sovereign power over a subordinate or alien who is separate
from the ruling power.” (Watts, 2000) The French colonial empire profoundly reorganized the
political environment, mode of economic development and social hierarchies in Cote d’Ivoire
(Conroy, 2010). Cote d’Ivoire became a French colony on March 10th, 1893. The French
colonial policy was a combination of assimilation and divide and rule, depending on their
interests. The assimilation policy tried to integrate the locals into the French nation and its
French culture. It entails embracing the French language, obtaining a higher education,
abandoning Indigenous practices like animism, and converting to Christianity. The colonial
“subjects” that willingly adopted the French culture were entitled to fully achieve the status of
French citizens (Tordoff, 2002). One of these “converts” known as évolués is Felix HouphouëtBoigny who attended the medical school at Dakar. The second policy divide and rule or divide
and conquer had a stronger impact on the relations between local ethnic groups. Despite, their
efforts of “assimilation”, the French colonial administration encountered much resistance from
certain local groups. Locals organized violent attacks against the colonists, stopping them from
entering their lands. To break up this resistance groups and prevent larger rebellions, the French
colonial empire exploited regional conflicts to implement its policy of divide and conquer
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(Schaeder, 2004). Elements of this technique involve: (1) aiding and promoting those who are
willing to cooperate, (2) creating divisions among the locals to prevent alliances that could
challenge the colonial administration, (3) fostering distrust between local rulers. This rule
strategy was used to interfere with the traditional leadership. The construction of a hierarchy of
ethnic categories among local populations was a process of the French capitalist development, at
the core of its imperialism. The colonial system everywhere in Africa favored one ethnic group
over the other and this created internal frictions. For example, the colonial administration gave
employment preference to specific ethnic groups, aiming to create competition among them and
increase insecurity and conflict. Groups from the East coast (Assinie region, near Ghana) where
French originally settled and where the first schools were built were more likely to be chosen for
employment (Edie, 2003). In Cote d’Ivoire, Southerners and river side groups enjoyed a
privileged status under the French colonial rule because many of them embraced Catholicism,
the colonizers. religion. French colonies were left with a centralized bureaucratic power structure
(direct rule) that impeded ethnic mobilization and suppressed nonviolent ethnic challenges. Such
system favored the social and political exclusion of certain groups while advantaging others.
5.2

Pre 1993: Political clientelism
On August 7, 1960, Côte d'Ivoire achieved independence from France with Felix

Houphouet-Boigny as its first president. Boigny was also the head of the only political party at
that time, Democratic Party of Ivory Coast – African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA). Although
he symbolized the politique d’ouverture, an inclusive political process, he suppressed all types of
opposition under the one-party rule through the PDCI. In regard to ethnicity, Boigny was
adamant that despite the sixty and more ethnic groups cohabiting within the territory, ethnicity
would not be a decisive factor in politics. Boigny developed what he referred to as

18
"geopolitique," which was subtle political clientelism based on ethnicity (Kone, 2011). Political
clientelism refers to “a more or less personalized, affective, and reciprocal relationship between
actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial
transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic
relationships” (LeMarchand, 1972). He tried to secure popular legitimacy by redistributing
economic and political resources across regions and among particular groups with the
intermediate of individuals known as "fils des régions." Boigny offered influential positions to
key regional leaders and actors, allowing them to develop their cities, villages in exchange for
political support. Some scholars suggest that this clientelism or patronage could be used to pull,
keep together a heterogeneous elite and in this way build up institutions over the long term
(Scott, 1969, Arriola 2009). The Africanist literature provides evidence for this stabilizing role of
patronage, which according to scholars, has been strategically deployed by leaders to consolidate
their regimes since independence (Lemarchand, 1972). Leaders provide political stability and
hold onto their regime in the process by maintaining elite clientelist linkages that connect them
to a cross-section of ethno-regional groups, as well as localities where the state cannot make
itself felt (Arriola, 2009). Bayart (1993) argues that this use of political clientelism has facilitated
the integration of ethnic representatives, bureaucrats into a more cohesive elite, united by their
common interest in accessing the state resources on which their positions depend. Indeed,
Boigny through these strategies tried consolidating his power but also pull together these ethnic
groups that had been antagonized by the colonial administration. He emphasized national
identity as a response to divisionist colonial policies as opposed to leaders in the multiparty era
who tried to use them to establish their own competitive ‘brand’ vis a vis other, rival parties as
we demonstrate below. The year 1990 represented the apogee of multipartyism, when opposition
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parties became legal. The major political parties are Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) led by Laurent
Gbagbo and strongly supported by the group Krou from the West where he is a native. The FPI
was founded in 1984 and was the first party of opposition. Its critics of the politics under
Houphouet Boigny resulted in the arrests of many of its members, among which Laurent
Gbagbo.
The transition to multipartism in Cote d’Ivoire, like in many African countries was a
consequence of both internal and external pressure. In 1989, the Ivorian government instituted
severe austerity policies to combat a liquidity crisis brought on by deflated commodity prices and
reduce the country’s unsustainable level of debt. These measures were unpopular amongst urban
and rural Ivorians, as government jobs were cut, and farmers saw lower prices for their crops. A
large-scale of nonviolent campaign by civil servants and students began to demand a government
that more accurately reflected the will of the people. For example, farmers in the north began
forming small farmers’ unions as a tactic to organize and defend their interests, transporters and
taxi drivers went on a simultaneous strike to protest the proliferation of roadblocks by members
of the military. Facing pressure from all sides of society, particularly with the military beginning
to turn against him, Houphouet-Boigny agreed to make major concessions to appease the public.
In May 1990, Houphouet-Boigny responded to student protests by agreeing to legalize
opposition parties, ushering in a multiparty system. Following up on this promise, he scheduled
elections for the fall of 1990. In the fall elections, Houphouet-Boigny’s main opposition was
Laurent Gbagbo, a university professor who had been the most vocal opponent of the regime and
one-party system, and became the de facto opposition leader with his party, Front Populaire
Ivoirien. Discreet external pressure also contributed to Boigny’s decision to move toward
multipartism. Like in many African countries, pressure from the West (external aid donors and
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creditors) after the end of the cold war pushed the government towards political pluralism as a
partial solution to its problems.
According to Munck (1997), Transitions like in CIV are known as reforms from below.
In these cases, opposition movements open the political system by demanding their inclusion in
the political arena, but simultaneously strong incumbent elites are able to impose constraints on
elite contestation. The regime that emerges from this mode of transition is a restricted democracy
because the dominant ruling party controls the levers of power, including access to the media,
and the electoral process in ways that preclude a meaningful challenge to its political hegemony.
Boigny’s decision to move toward multipartism was a way to appease protesters and financial
donors to remain in power. It remained very shallow because the institutions were not changing
at the same rhythm as social demands. The elections of 1990 support this assessment with only
two parties running, and Boigny winning 81.68% of the vote. This rapid transition however has
led politicians to organize people along the most readily available cleavage lines, in this case
ethnicity.
The Democratic Party of Côte d' Ivoire (PDCI) formed in 1946, is supported by the group
Akan in the East-Center of the Country, where its leader Houphouet Boigny is native. Finally,
the Rally of Republicans (RDR) supported by the Northern populations (Mande and Voltaique
groups) and led by a native of the region Alassane Ouattara. The RDR was formed as a liberal
offshoot of the ruling party PDCI in 1994. Considering the ethnic cleavage structure in the
country, these parties emerged in what appeared to be an ethnic competition for power. In fact,
Cote’ D’Ivoire has four major ethnic divisions: Akan (east and center, including Lagoon peoples
of the southeast), Krou (southwest), Mande (West), Voltaique (north center and northeast). The
Baoulés, in the Akan division comprise the single largest subgroup with 15%-20% of the
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population. They are based in the central region around Bouake and Yamoussoukro. The Betes in
the Krou division, the Senoufos in the north, and the Malinkes in the northwest are the next
largest groups, with 10%-15% each of the national population (Meledje, 2018). Many Ivorians
refer to northern ethnic groups as dioulas because of their trading activities and their merchant
occupations. However, this is not entirely correct because dioulas are a Mande ethnic group
inhabiting several West African countries. And just like other groups, have a significant presence
in neighboring countries, including Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Burkina Faso. They are
characterized as a highly successful merchant caste however, not all Northerners are dioulas.

Figure 1 Regional Repartition of ethnic divisions in CIV
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Figure 2 Regional Repartition of ethnic groups in CIV

5.3

1993-2000 : Doctrine de l’Ivoirité or Ivorianness
The discussion on the doctrine de l'Ivoirité or Ivorianness represents the essential part of

our analysis because it is the first legal strategy that openly introduced national origins in
politics.
Henri Konan Bedie, former President of the National Assembly under Houphouet
Boigny, assumed the presidency on December 8, 1993. In 1994, he introduced what is known as
the "doctrine de l'Ivoirité" or Ivoirianness as a strategy to exclude former prime minister under
Boigny, the leader of the Rally of Republicans party (RDR), Alassane Ouattara, from the
upcoming electoral contest (Hervieu-Wane, 2004). In his analysis of the socio-cultural
implication of the “Ivoirité”, Francis Akindes addressed the question of Ivoirianness. According
to him, “Ivoirianness is the set of socio-historical, geographical and linguistic data which enables
us to say that an individual is a citizen of the Ivory Coast or an Ivoirian. The person, who asserts
his Ivoirianness is supposed to be born of Ivoirian parents belonging to one of the ethnic groups
native to the Ivory Coast.” (Meledje, 2018) Bedie engaged in a propaganda against his opponent
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by accusing him of being a foreigner and from neighboring country Burkina Faso, therefore
undeserving of leading the country. This doctrine created a communal fracture within the
population. First, it created strong xenophobia in Cote d'Ivoire, a fear of foreigners accused of
being responsible for the country's poverty and insecurity. The principal targets of these hostile
behaviors became foreigners from the Northern neighboring countries, Burkina Faso, and Mali.
An amalgam emerged between these populations and those from the Northern part of Côte
d'Ivoire because of their cultural proximity. The "Nordistes" (as other groups are often
identifiable by their names) were not considered “true” Ivorians. As the political tensions among
political parties increased, violent confrontations between ethnic groups emerged across the
country. In 1999, a coup d’état allegedly orchestrated by a group of militants favorable to
Ouattara overthrew Henri Konan Bedie, who was forced to flee the Country (Rodrigue Kone,
2011). This is perceived by many as the end of the Akan group hegemony. Until 2000, this idea
of Ivoirité was perceived as a cultural and political concept that emphasized Ivory Coast identity.
However, on July 23 and 24, 2000, a constitution referendum was held requesting that changes
be made to the eligibility requirements for presidential candidates. According to Article 35 of the
new Constitution which founded the Second Republic, "The President of the Republic must be of
Ivorian origin, born of a father and mother who are also Ivorian by birth. He must never have
renounced Ivorian nationality. He must never have used another nationality. He must have
resided in the Ivory Coast for five continuous years preceding the date of the elections and have
a total of ten years of effective residence”. This law excluded many potential candidates among
them, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, who was accused of being a citizen of neighboring Burkina
Faso, therefore making him ineligible to run for the presidency of Côte d’Ivoire (Akindes, 2003).
Many justifications were given to support these changes but the ones that appealed to many were
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economic. The Commission for Social and Cultural Affairs of the Conseil Economique et Social
published a report on immigration where it evaluated the impact of immigration on the country's
natural demographic equilibrium, its political and economic life in terms of unemployment of
'native-born' Ivorians, and on social cohesion and security. The report stated: “The fact is, despite
their (the immigrants) low level of education in general, they (the Syro-Lebanese, Mauritanians,
Malians) have a hold on the trade in this country, thus filling most of the jobs in the informal
sector. The outcome is that the native Ivorians have a higher rate of unemployment (6.4 percent)
than these immigrants (3.6 percent) ... The hold of these immigrants on jobs in certain sectors of
national activity (trade, road transport, agro-industrial firms, butchering, etc.) is such that it
prevents Ivorians from competing with them ... Immigration is increasingly become one of the
structural causes for the increase in poverty of Ivorians.” (Akindes, 2003) The Ivoirité further
polarized the political parties and ethnic groups and created strong boundaries between them. It
is a confrontational strategy that created us-versus-them distinctions, and two camps were
formed, the Pro-Ouattara (North) and the Anti-Ouattara (West, South). While, for his opponents,
Ouattara is the prototype of the 'false Ivorian' who is claiming something to which he has no
right, for the inhabitants of the North he is symbolic of their loss of status as citizens, having
been constantly deprived of his civic rights by governments in the hands of 'people from the
South', or 'Bushmen'. (Akindes, 2003)

5.4

2001-2010: Emergence of civil wars
In 2000, Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the FPI, became President after an electoral process

that excluded most other major political parties (Akindès, 2003). He followed his predecessors'
steps by using ethnicity as a strategic coalition to win constituencies, secure voters' loyalty, and
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vilify and exclude opponents from power positions. In fact, in the months preceding the October
presidential elections, political leaders exploited ethnic divisions to oust rivals, used the state
apparatus to repress opponents, and incited hatred and fear among populations which had for
decades lived in relative harmony. Their actions led to unprecedented waves of violence which
shocked Ivorians and members of the international community alike. The regime essentially used
propaganda to reinforce the cleavage and build a strong hostility toward northerners (ProOuattara). In 2001, a coup attempt against President Gbagbo's government set off a frenzy of
attacks against foreigners. The President and his entourage implicated that foreign nationals from
Burkina Faso were responsible for the attempt. Considering the existing amalgam between
foreign nationals and Northerners cause by the Ivoirite doctrine, it led to various unpunished
attacks against these groups. After detaining hundreds of RDR militants, the police and
gendarmes routinely used extreme forms of brutality and torture, resulting in the deaths of
several young men. At least fifteen young men "disappeared" after detention. Numerous mid-and
high-level RDR activists were tortured and imprisoned without due process. Hospital and clinic
workers reported treating hundreds of victims for broken bones, lacerations, burns, concussions,
and head fractures sustained while in custody (Human Right Watch, 2001). Civilians were
detained after being stopped and asked for their identification, dragged out of their homes and
workplaces, or seized while participating in demonstrations. Scores of civilians who were
uninvolved politically were captured exclusively and explicitly based on ethnicity, religion, or
their perceived nationality. In April 2001, eight paramilitary gendarmes were charged with
murder in connection with the massacre of the Charnier de Yopougon. The Charnier de
Yogougon remains one of the most gruesome attacks of that time. On October 26, 2000, people,
essentially young men accused to be pro-Ouattara, or Foreigners were arrested and murdered by
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the gendarmes. More than fifty-sept bodies were found in a ditch in Abobo. Ibrahim a survivor
affirmed “all my friends are dead, simply because they were dioulas. Because they had the
wrong name” (Liberation, 2000). None of the eight officers accused were arrested or taken into
custody. On, August 3, 2001, all of them were acquitted. The judge ruled that the prosecutors
had failed to produce sufficient evidence directly linking the gendarmes to the killings. The two
survivors of the massacre refused to testify in the trial, citing fears for their safety (Human Right
Watch, 2001). These actions created fear for survival among northern populations.
In 2002, an armed rebellion, later known as the Forces Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire/New
Forces led by Guillaume Soro and composed of "Nordistes" attempted to overthrow the
government. By midday on September 19, they had control of the North of the country.
According to the New forces, this attack was a response to the impunity for the crimes
committed against northern ethnic groups and specially the dioulas. They accused President
Gbagbo of perpetuating the same methods of incitement and ethnic polarization by violating the
rights. They claimed that his policies and decisions aimed to privilege populations from the
West, including his ethnic group, while undermining the representation in the government of
those from the North (Dembele, 2003). The rebels demanded the banishment of Ivorianness and
the end to the impunity of the armed forced involved in the production of the mass grave in
Yopougon and in various exactions (attacks and burning of mosques, assassinations). It became
the first Ivorian civil war. It led to a geographic fracture between the North controlled by the
New forces and the South controlled by the government. The fear of becoming a minority drove
both sides to violence. Despite the Pretoria Agreement and the final cessation of all hostilities,
and the end of the war throughout the national territory in 2005, ethnicity remained a salient
strategy to gain power. Many years of injustice, mistrust, and grievances have created a profound

27
rupture between the Krou group (supporters of Laurent Gbagbo) and the Voltaique group
(Alassane Ouattara supporters). In 2006 Djigue Dramane, a young Ivorian declared to a
correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor that he was assaulted by Young Patriots (ardent
supporters of President Gbagbo) as the police watched. He claimed that he was on his way to an
opposition party press conference when he was attacked because of his northern name (Hartill,
2006). The 2010 elections revealed how effortless it is for the political elites and presidential
candidates to manipulate this ethnic cleavage to secure votes. A strategy that led to the second
Ivorian Civil war from 2010 to 2011. Many considered these elections as the "duel des
champions" between the three major political actors since 1995, Henri Konan Bedie (Akan
group), Laurent Gbagbo (Krou group), and Alassane Ouattara (Voltaique group). Although
ethnicity is not explicitly used as the directing line of the electoral campaigns, each candidate's
disproportionate efforts in their regions showed that they were aware of the cleavage and utilized
it. Ouattara and Gbagbo were the final contestants after the first round. Bedie and Ouattara
formed an alliance during the second tour of the elections against Gbagbo, and it is finally
Ouattara that is proclaimed winner (Kone, 2011). Laurent Gbagbo and his supporters contested
the victory. Violence erupted in Abidjan and its surrounding cities with more than 3000
casualties, a post-electoral crisis that ended with the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo. Throughout the
post-election period, President Gbagbo and his entourage turned the state-owned Radiodiffusion
Télévision Ivoirienne (RTI) into what might be described as a propaganda machine. The term
“foreigner” was consistently used by pro-Gbagbo militants to signify West African immigrants
and ethnic groups from the North. Often such statements came from official government sources.
On January 10, the UN Security Council “strongly condemned and demanded an immediate halt
to the use of media, especially … RTI, to propagate false information to incite hatred and
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violence, including against the UN” (Le Figaro, 2010). On January 19, the UN SecretaryGeneral’s Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect
issued a statement of concern about “continuing hate speech that appears to be aimed at inciting
violent attacks against particular ethnic and national groups.” On February 25, Charles Blé
Goudé, leader of the Young Patriots affiliated with the regime of Laurent Gbagbo, was shown in
a meeting televised on RTI telling his followers: “I give you this order, which must be applied in
every neighborhood…. When you go back to your neighborhoods… you must operate
checkpoints to monitor the comings and goings in your neighborhoods and denounce every
foreigner who enters” (Human Right Watch, 2011). In the same broadcast, another member of
the Young Patriots said, “If you are Ivorian, you have to denounce [foreigners] anytime, and if
you don’t denounce them, you are a rebel, you are the enemy of Côte d’Ivoire, and you must be
treated as such!” In the March 9-15 edition of Le Temps, a paper formerly directed by people
close to the Gbagbo regime, a journalist wrote: “Ouattara’s “Blakoros” have decamped like rats
in cassava fields, followed by the Burkinabé mercenaries who have been fireproof against our
regular forces…. These rebels … in full flight before General Mangou’s men, have infested
Abobo like city and field rats, coming in fact from the rebellion’s stinking sewers…. Like
hyenas, [Ouattara and French President Sarkozy] giggle and drool at the sight of decaying
corpses that are on their macabre menu…. In Abobo, mercenaries, rebels, Licorne and UNOCI
wear the same clothes. That is to say, in the sewers of Abobo, nothing is needed to distinguish
one vermin from another.” (K. Maurice, 2011). Northerners and West African immigrants were
repeatedly dehumanized and described as potential “suspect presences” to be “neutralized”, as
the “vermin” did not distinguish from each other. Hundreds more killings followed. On the other
side, Alassane Ouattara was also mobilizing and encouraging his militants to stand their ground,
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although with more tempered messages because of the support he received from the international
community.

Figure 3 Divided Map of Cote d’Ivoire. The green zone represents the cities controlled by the
rebel forces loyal to Alassane Ouattara. The orange zone represents the safety zone under the
UN and French Troops’ control. The pink zone represents the cities controlled by forces loyal to
incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo.

6

ANALYSIS

So, what caused the civil wars in Cote d’Ivoire? Our argument can be presented in the
chart below.
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Figure 4 The path from colonial legacy to civil wars in Cote d’Ivoire

What caused the civil wars in Cote d’Ivoire? First, the evidence demonstrates the impact
of the French colonial policies on the relationships between ethnic groups. The construction of a
hierarchy of ethnic categories among local populations established boundaries between them.
The favoritism by colonial administration of one ethnic group over the other created internal
frictions and tensions. A system which strongly favored competition for resources, social and
political exclusion. The configuration of ethnic groups and the perception they had of other
groups was built during the colonial period. For example, Southerners and river side groups
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enjoyed a privileged status under the French colonial rule compared to Northern groups. This
ruling strategy to control colonial territories, left post-colonial administrations with a challenge
to mobilize and unify populations. However as indicated in our chart, this legacy by itself does
not cause ethnic conflict. As we can observe in CIV, no civil war occurred in the country for
almost forty-two years post-independence. The interaction between colonial legacy and party
system impacts the likelihood of ethnic civil wars. So colonial legacy is a necessary component
in our argument however not sufficient to cause civil war.
I claimed that in the first path, under a single-party rule, there was no civil war in CIV
because it was an internal election within members of the same party, so ethnic cleavage was not
considered a political strategy to win. Candidates under a single-party rule must use a different
mobilization strategy than those under multiparty rule. Indeed, Boigny utilized political
clientelism. offered influential positions to key regional leaders and actors, allowing them to
develop their cities, villages in exchange for political support. He did not have any opponents, so
his main goal was to mobilize populations around him and prevent potential rebellions.
Houphouet-Boigny through these strategies tried to consolidate his power by pulling together all
these ethnic groups that had been antagonized by the colonial administration. He emphasized
national identity as a response to divisionist colonial policies as opposed to leaders in the
multiparty era who tried to use them to establish their own competitive ‘brand’ vis a vis other,
rival parties. The case of CIV supports our hypothesis that ethnic civil wars are less likely under
a single party rule. However, it is important to underline that other types of violence can occur
among ethnic groups under a single-party rule. Those are usually small-scale local conflicts (less
than 25 battle-related deaths) that do not involve the use of conventional welfare and are easily
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resolved/contained. Civil wars, understood as armed conflicts that exceed a threshold of 1,000
deaths are less likely to occur under a single-party system.
Under multipartism, I present two major mechanisms through which the French colonial
legacy caused the Ivorian civil wars. According to Posner (2005), through a process of electoral
competition, the most useful identity to mobilize will be the one that puts the person or the party
in a minimum winning collation. To understand why Ivorian leaders built their political parties
along ethnic lines instead of other identities, we have to understand what the cleavage structure
looks like (Posner, 2005). First, we should know the number of cleavage dimensions it contains.
Secondly, we should identify the number and relative sizes of the groups located on each
cleavage. The country is divided among four major groups: Akan (east and center, including
Lagoon peoples of the Southeast), Krou (Southwest), Mande (Northwest), Voltaique (Northeast).
The Baoulés, in the Akan division comprise the single largest subgroup with 15%-20% of the
population. They are based in the central region around Bouake and Yamoussoukro. The Betes in
the Krou division, the Senoufos in the north, and the Malinkes in the northwest are the next
largest groups, with 10%-15% (Meledje, 2018). Religion is another important identity in the
country with 42.90% of the total population practicing Islam, 33.9% Christianity, and 3.6% of
the population follows traditional African religions (Animism, fetishism) and 19.10% have no
religion. Therefore, ethnicity represents a minimum winning coalition in CIV because compared
to other identities in the country, it is the only one that constitutes a good mobilization site for
constituencies with fewest members with whom to share the power. Our case study supports this
assessment as the major political parties are Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) led by Laurent Gbagbo
and strongly supported by the group Krou from the West where he is a native. The Democratic
Party of Côte d' Ivoire (PDCI) is supported by the group Akan in the East-Center of the Country,
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where its leader Houphouet Boigny is native. Finally, the Rally of Republicans (RDR) supported
by the Northern populations (Mande and Senoufo/Lobi groups) and led by a native of the region
Alassane Ouattara.
The first mechanism in the path toward civil war was ethnic polarization through political
parties. Political leaders reinforced the boundaries between groups with exclusionary strategies
and tactics. In Cote d’Ivoire, it was the doctrine de l’Ivoirité or Ivorianness. In fact, after
President Bedie introduced this discriminatory idea in 1994 to exclude his opponent Alassane
Ouattara, he created a communal fracture that further pushed ethnic groups apart. It forced them
to align with a political party, one that can defend the interests of their ethnic group. This
fracture reached its apex after the 2000 referendum and the legalization of Ivoirianness. Groups
from the North and immigrants aligned with the RDR of Alassane Ouattara while the 'people
from the South' or 'Bushmen' aligned with the FPI of Laurent Gbagbo (Akindes, 2003).
The second mechanism in the path toward civil war was the fear of victimization. This fear
was essentially built through discursive practices. Through propagandas, the elites created a usversus-them by diabolizing the other group using terms like “rats” “vermin” “rebel” “the enemy
of Cote d’Ivoire”. A member of the Young Patriots proclaimed, “if you are Ivorian, you have to
denounce [foreigners] anytime, and if you don’t denounce them, you are a rebel, you are the
enemy of Côte d’Ivoire, and you must be treated as such!”. Political leaders created a fear of
victimization within the population in a way that citizens did not view the choice between peace
and violence but rather between fighting or being a victim. As Susan Woodward wrote “fear of
becoming a minority is exactly what is motivating the people to fight.” Each group feared for
their survival. The pro-Gbagbo feared that they would become an economic minority in their
country, they were conditioned to believe that “foreigners” were trying to steal their resources
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(especially their lands), their jobs and their executive branch (during elections). The report by the
Commission for Social and Cultural Affairs of the Conseil Economique et Social on immigration
was a strong pillar of this rhetoric. And the hate speech led to targeted acts of violence to defeat
the “enemy”. On the other hand, the pro-Ouattara also feared for their survival. They were
unjustly targeted and labeled as “enemy of Cote d’Ivoire” when many of them are Ivorians. They
faced the choice of using violence to defend themselves and their rights or become victims. The
civil wars of 2002 and 2011 appear as a desperate act by populations to avoid victimization.
Also, as the evidence in Cote d’Ivoire suggests, these confrontational tactics were more salient
around election times. The evidence collected in Cote d’Ivoire support our initial theory that
political leaders instrumentalize the legacy of colonial administrations to remain in power and
that cause civil wars. Under a multiparty system this instrumentalization take place through two
major mechanisms: (1) the ethnic polarization of political parties and (2) the installation of the
fear of victimization.
Some people have argued that Ivoirianness is essentially a nationalist policy that aims to promote
the interests of the country and instill a sentiment of pride among Ivorians. Was Ivoirianness the
representation of a genuine nationalist concern of was it as many believe a political strategy. In
2010, during his presidential campaign in Ferkésedougou (a city situated in the North), President
Bédié made comments about “Ivoirité”. As reported in an article in the front page of the local
newspaper Nord-Sud, he allegedly reported to the population that Ivoirité was a
misunderstanding. It was obvious that Bédié was attempting to win the votes of northerners at
the polls (Zouande, 2011). But this left many wondering about his real intentions at the time, and
why he never corrected this “misunderstanding” and is now admitting it after the loss of so many
human lives.
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Our initial theory that the interaction between French colonial legacy and multipartyism is
likely to cause civil wars was verified in Cote d’Ivoire. The French colonial practices politicized
ethnicity which created ethnically based politics in the post-colonial and tensions among ethnic
groups, yet it is the shift to multiparty system that led to the Ivorian civil wars. Nevertheless, I
recognize that such ethnic conflicts come about through other processes. First, the interaction
between constructivist and instrumentalist theories can work in different ways than the one
demonstrated above. I believe that there are other paths to ethnic conflicts because it is not a one
size fits all. Secondly, it is important to mention that violence can occur under a single-party
rule. Because the paper focuses on the dependent variable, the occurrence of ethnic civil wars
(conflicts that exceed a threshold of 1,000 deaths), I coded the variable as “civil wars” or “no
civil wars” in the chart. However, other types of ethnic violence can occur under a single-party
rule. There are usually small-scale local that are easily resolved/contained and do not involve the
use of conventional welfare.
In the case of Cote D’Ivoire, all the mechanisms in our theory were proved correct.
However, there is the issue of generalizability. Some scope conditions are to be considered. So,
which one of the independent variables are critical? Which combination of factors is critical to
explain civil wars in most cases? In my opinion, colonial legacy is a strong operative factor.
Anytime external rulers establish themselves; they implement strategies to solidify their power.
The colonial administrations were not different. Both the French and the British colonial
administrations utilized the divide and rule strategies to tame resistance and gain power over
local populations. In many countries, the results were also similar, rising tensions among groups
(ethnic, religious or others) because of favoritism by colonial rulers. The combination of these
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strategies is a facilitating factor in creating civil wars in many former colonies. On the other
hand, the impact of political systems on civil wars is less strong in other cases than it is in CIV.

7

IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS

This analysis concludes that ethnic civil wars are likely resulting from the interaction
between colonial legacy and multipartyism. However, multipartyism is the essence of
Democracy and free, competitive elections are necessary for people to defend their interests. It
underlines a key question in the study of African politics, is Democracy fit for African countries?
And by Democracy I essentially refers to multipartyism and competitive elections. It appears that
in many countries like Mali, RDC and others, its forcefully introduction by Western countries
have led to political instability and economic downfall. Many of these countries achieved
independence roughly sixty years ago and their institutions are not strong or effective enough yet
to sustain the demands of Democracy. France itself became one after about eight hundred years
of rule by a King. While I am not advocating in favor of Autocracy, I believe that Western
powers are motivated by their own interests rather than the prosperity of the African continent.
Democracy is imposed without considerations of History (colonial legacy, artificial boundaries
which geographically are not present), the traditional and cultural landscape of these countries,
many of which lived peacefully before imperialism. Under Houphouet Boigny, Cote d’Ivoire
was politically and economically stable. “Le vieux” as natives called him built a strategy that
was fit for the Ivorian ethnic groups, geographic boundaries, and economic challenges at that
time.
In my opinion, future research should distance itself from the one size fits all approach
and think of political regimes that can work for countries that are more similar in terms of
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legacy, ethnic geographic distribution, and such. For example, this case study highlighted some
scope conditions that affects the generalizability of my argument. This theory can be applicable
to former colonies where the divide and conquer strategy was used to control the populations. As
evidence shows that the British colonial empire also utilized this method in their colonies, I
predict that similar results might be observed; Sierra Leone is an example. In my opinion, my
theory can be applied to all African cases where there has been a colonial strategy of “divide and
conquer” based on ethnicity and that then had electoral politics.
Although the evidence suggests that the geographic distribution of ethnic groups across
the territories is not the cause of civil wars, it is important to mention its particularity. Indeed,
groups are clearly separated from North to South and from West to East. As described above
particular cities and regions are associated with specific ethnic groups. This artificial division
made exclusionary strategies easier to implement. Different conclusions may be drawn in a
country where ethnic groups are heterogeneously spread across the territory.
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